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Abstract
Background: Standardised packaging (SP) of tobacco products is an innovative tobacco control measure opposed by
transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) whose responses to the UK government’s public consultation on SP argued that
evidence was inadequate to support implementing the measure. The government’s initial decision, announced 11 months
after the consultation closed, was to wait for ‘more evidence’, but four months later a second ‘independent review’ was
launched. In view of the centrality of evidence to debates over SP and TTCs’ history of denying harms and manufacturing
uncertainty about scientific evidence, we analysed their submissions to examine how they used evidence to oppose SP.
Methods and Findings: We purposively selected and analysed two TTC submissions using a verification-oriented cross-
documentary method to ascertain how published studies were used and interpretive analysis with a constructivist
grounded theory approach to examine the conceptual significance of TTC critiques. The companies’ overall argument was
that the SP evidence base was seriously flawed and did not warrant the introduction of SP. However, this argument was
underpinned by three complementary techniques that misrepresented the evidence base. First, published studies were
repeatedly misquoted, distorting the main messages. Second, ‘mimicked scientific critique’ was used to undermine
evidence; this form of critique insisted on methodological perfection, rejected methodological pluralism, adopted a
litigation (not scientific) model, and was not rigorous. Third, TTCs engaged in ‘evidential landscaping’, promoting a parallel
evidence base to deflect attention from SP and excluding company-held evidence relevant to SP. The study’s sample was
limited to sub-sections of two out of four submissions, but leaked industry documents suggest at least one other company
used a similar approach.
Conclusions: The TTCs’ claim that SP will not lead to public health benefits is largely without foundation. The tools of Better
Regulation, particularly stakeholder consultation, provide an opportunity for highly resourced corporations to slow, weaken,
or prevent public health policies.
Please see later in the article for the Editors’ Summary.
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Introduction
Beginning in the mid-1990s, governments globally have sought
to transform policymaking and regulatory activity through a
number of reforms collectively known in Europe as Better
Regulation [1]. Although these reforms are expected to make
policymaking more transparent and evidence-based, in some
jurisdictions their implementation has been shown to occur under
pressure from corporations whose products are damaging to
health, including British American Tobacco (BAT), with the
expectation that the associated procedures would make it harder
to pass public health policies [2]. In the UK, Better Regulation is
underpinned by neoliberal assumptions concerning business
competitiveness, and official guidance declares that regulation
should not ‘impose costs and obligations’ on business and other
groups ‘unless a robust and compelling case has been made’ [3].
This process in turn requires the methodical identification and
valuation of all potential costs and benefits of proposed regulation,
achieved predominantly through impact assessment and stake-
holder consultation [4]. Officials are obliged to seek the views of
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stakeholders, including corporations, on the government’s cost and
benefit estimates as well as underlying ‘key assumptions and data’
[3]. Commercial entities that will be affected by proposed
regulation are thus given an explicit role in evaluating, confirming,
or disputing evidence used in formulating those policies.
The requirements of Better Regulation have significant
implications for public health, where major corporations with
products damaging to health, including transnational tobacco
companies (TTCs) and alcohol [5] and food [6,7] industries, have
a long track record (in tobacco’s case, dating back to at least the
early 1950s) of manipulating and misrepresenting evidence to deny
the harms of their products, question the benefits and highlight the
costs of public health policies [8]. TTCs have systematically sought
to fabricate doubt and controversy over evidence unfavourable to
their interests by labelling research demonstrating tobacco’s harms
as ‘junk science’, commissioning their own research to challenge
established evidence on tobacco’s harms or policy impacts [9,10],
and promoting a set of industry-specified scientific standards
collectively termed ‘sound science’ and ‘good epidemiology
practices’ [11,12]. This evidence of TTC willingness to challenge
and undermine the scientific evidence on tobacco harms and on
policy impacts [12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21] raises concerns
that stakeholder consultation and impact assessment may make it
easier for TTCs to successfully obstruct public health policies and
poses a challenge to the underlying assumption of Better
Regulation that evidence optimises policymaking, rendering it
more rational and efficient.
The UK experience with standardised packaging (SP) of
tobacco products provides a major opportunity to explore the
tobacco industry’s current approach to and use of evidence. SP
aims to prevent the use of packaging as a powerful marketing tool
by removing all brand imagery and text (other than name) and
instead implementing standard shape/colour packs with promi-
nent pictorial health warnings. First mooted in 1986, SP was
consistently opposed by the tobacco industry [22] and it was only
in December 2012 that Australia became the first country to adopt
the policy [23], despite threatened and ongoing litigation by TTCs
[24,25]. The UK was the next country to consider SP formally;
following a four-month public consultation and 11 months of
deliberation, the government announced that it had decided to
‘wait and see’ how the Australian experience ‘panned out’ before
making a decision [26]. Parliamentary debates [26] and media
statements indicated that doubts over the adequacy of the evidence
(and the related anticipation of legal challenge by TTCs) were the
main reason for the government’s hesitance [27,28]. However,
four months later, when it became clear that SP might be
introduced through House of Lords amendments to unrelated
legislation on children and families, the government announced a
further, independent review of existing and new evidence on SP
that is to report in March 2014 [29].
Prior to the consultation, the Department of Health (DH)
commissioned a systematic review of the evidence base on SP
(hereafter referred to as the Moodie review, after the lead author’s
name), which concluded that there was ‘strong evidence’ that SP
would reduce the attractiveness and appeal of tobacco products
and increase the effectiveness of health warnings and, therefore,
had the potential to ‘contribute to reductions in the harm caused
by tobacco smoking’ [30]. The four main TTCs (BAT, Japan
Tobacco International (JTI), Philip Morris Limited (PM), and
Imperial Tobacco) submitted large volumes of written submissions
to the stakeholder consultation. Our initial analysis of these
showed that the companies’ main collective argument was that SP
would not ‘work’ [31]. The TTCs, on the one hand, dismissed the
existing evidence base indicating a likely positive impact of SP and,
on the other hand, cited a large volume of alternative evidence (77
items) to support their argument that SP would not work.
However, only a small number (17) of this alternative body of
evidence was directly relevant to SP, and of these, the majority (14)
was industry funded/linked and none was peer-reviewed [31]. By
contrast, the studies included in the Moodie review were all
relevant, the majority were peer-reviewed, and none was industry
funded/linked.
Here, we build on this initial overview by providing a detailed
examination of how the industry critiqued evidence supporting SP.
We extend the current literature on TTCs’ misuse and misrep-
resentation of science, summarised above, by building an in-depth
conceptual account of industry arguments and practices used to
undermine published evidence. We thus provide insights into the
complexities of evidence-based policymaking where corporate
interests conflict with public policy goals.
Methods
Data Sources
The four TTCs’ submissions to the consultation were published
in full on individual company websites. Our initial review of all
four TTCs’ submissions and coding of the volume, relevance, and
quality of all the evidence cited by TTCs highlighted both the
large volume of submissions and evidence cited. Submissions from
the four TTCs totalled 1521 pages and cited 143 pieces of formal
written research evidence [31]. We therefore limited our analysis
to two companies, BAT and JTI [32,33], chosen for the following
reasons. BAT has a large market share in countries that have
already implemented (Australia) or are considering (e.g., New
Zealand) SP, making its strategy of wider interest. JTI has a large
market share in the UK and Ireland (also considering SP), yet,
unlike BAT and Philip Morris Ltd, was not subject to the litigation
that led to document disclosure. With no internal documents
available for scrutiny, far less is known about JTI, and analysis of
its submission may therefore provide some insights into how the
company seeks to influence policy.
We selected for analysis those sections of the BAT and JTI
submissions (including expert reports) that focused on whether SP
would produce the intended public health objectives (i.e., whether
it would work). This represented a core topic in three (BAT, JTI,
and PM) of the four TCCs’ submissions and accounted for the
largest volume of cited evidence (88/143) [31]. BAT and JTI also
submitted a total of 14 expert reports covering different aspects of
SP (two appended to the BAT submission and 12 submitted
separately by JTI) [34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47].
Of these, six (one BAT, five JTI) authored by three experts related
to the core topic of whether SP would work. We selected the one
relevant BAT report by Klick [34] and the two most recent JTI
reports by Keegan and Devinney [38,40] for analysis (Table 1).
The reports by Keegan [38] and Devinney [40] critiqued a very
large number of published studies on the impacts of SP, many of
which were included in the Moodie review; Klick’s report [34] was
less detailed. We read all three [34,38,40] to form an idea of the
type of critique offered, ascertaining that the critiques were similar,
particularly those of Keegan, a business/marketing professor, and
Devinney, an economics/business professor, although Devinney’s
tended to be more detailed. We therefore selected two of
Devinney’s study critiques for critical appraisal. Hammond et al,
2011 [48] was an online survey of young women (smokers and
non-smokers) randomised to view different pack designs. The main
finding was that fully branded female packs had greater appeal
and were more likely to be associated with glamour, slimness,
attractiveness, and less harm compared to plain packs. Thrasher
Tobacco Company Use and Misuse of Evidence in Policy
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et al, 2011 [49] conducted experimental auctions among adult
smokers, and the main finding was that the lowest bid was
associated with plain packs with prominent pictorial health
warnings. We selected these study critiques because they contained
detailed critiques using a wide variety of statistical and other
methodological arguments that were also used for critiquing other
studies.
Analysis
We conducted four types of analysis. We examined the
presentation of author CVs in all 14 expert reports. We then
conducted two types of in-depth analysis on the selected
documents (two main submissions and three expert reports):
first, a verification-oriented cross-documentary analysis compar-
ing references made to published sources with the original sources
to ascertain how they had been used; second, an interpretive
analysis to identify conceptual themes. The interpretive analysis
was framed by the social constructivist perspectives of social
studies of science [50,51] and the premise that facts, including
scientific facts, are socially and interactionally constructed and
open to alternative interpretations. The literature on the
industry’s use and misuse of science (summarised in the
Introduction) also formed a sensitising empirical backdrop to
the analysis. We used thematic analysis informed by the approach
and techniques of constructivist grounded theory [52,53]:
systematic conceptual coding (using Atlas.ti software), constant
comparison, discourse sensitivity, attention to divergent data, and
conceptual conclusions. One researcher (SU) read and micro-
coded selected sections of the documents line-by-line for salient
themes. Coding was inductive and emergent, although some
themes replicated those identified during the preceding literature
review, for example: (ignoring) weight of evidence; diversion
(introducing alternative evidence); selective quoting; and whole-
sale discounting (of evidence). A sub-sample of the material (13%)
was coded by two other researchers (JH, GF); there was
considerable convergence in the initial analytic themes identified
and agreement was reached through discussion on the differences
in coding. The micro (first level) themes were grouped under
broader categories; for example, the themes ‘misleading quoting’,
‘misleading interpretation’, and ‘selective quoting’ were grouped
under ‘misleading quoting of evidence’. Emerging ideas were
discussed by the wider team at interim analytic meetings. Finally,
we conducted critical appraisal of Devinney’s critique [40] of
Hammond et al, 2011 [48] and Thrasher et al, 2011 [49]. Two
authors (SU, AG) conducted this analysis with comments
obtained from the original study authors.
Results
The 15 pages (of 77) in the main BAT submission and 26 pages
(of 116) in the JTI submission (41 of 193 pages (21%) combined)
that dealt with the question of whether or not SP would work were
analysed. Of the three expert reports we selected, we analysed 4
pages of Klick (BAT) [34], 29 pages of Keegan (JTI) [38], and 31
pages of Devinney (JTI) [40].
The BAT and JTI documents make the case that the evidence
for SP was seriously and fatally flawed, delivering detailed and
mostly externally commissioned critiques of the individual
published studies and the Moodie review and reiterating that the
DH had relied on ‘insufficient and unreliable’ [32] or ‘unreliable
Table 1. Number of pages analysed from all BAT and JTI submission documents.
Document type Subject matter Author, date Number of pages
Number of
pages analysed
British American Tobacco (BAT)
Main submission Consultation response BAT, 2012 [32] 77 15
Expert reports Smoking attitudes and behaviours Klick, 2012 [34] 15 4
Review of impact assessment Gibson, 2012 [35] 30 0
All BAT documents 122 19
Japan Tobacco International (JTI)
Main submission Consultation response JTI, 2012 [33] 116 26
Expert reports Smoking attitudes and behaviours Keegan, 2010 [38] 105 29
Devinney, 2012 [40] 60 31
Keegan, 2008 [36] 90 0
Keegan, 2009 [37] 35 0
Devinney, 2010 [39] 125 0
Smoking decision-making Steinberg, 2010 [41] 98 0
Dhar & Nowliss, 2010 [42] 60 0
Economic impacts Lilico, 2008 [43] 89 0
Lilico, 2010 [44] 87 0
Procedural: Better Regulation Cave, 2010 [45] 61 0
Trade agreements Gervais, 2010 [46] 36 0
Illicit trade Chaudhry & Zimmerman, 2012 [47] 180 0
All JTI documents 1142 86
BAT and JTI documents (combined) 1264 105
Documents with pages analysed are indicated by boldface.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001629.t001
Tobacco Company Use and Misuse of Evidence in Policy
PLOS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 3 March 2014 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | e1001629
and unconvincing’ [33] evidence while ignoring other relevant
evidence [32,33]. We first look at the size of the submissions and
their potentially debilitating effect on policymaking and then detail
three industry practices—misleading quoting of evidence, mim-
icked scientific critique, and evidential landscaping—instrumental
in undermining the evidence base for SP (Table 2).
Overwhelming Volume of Submissions
The size of the BAT (77 pages) and JTI (116 pages)
submissions was their most immediately noticeable feature; the
12 expert reports that formed part of the JTI submission made up
a further 1026 pages and the 2 in the BAT submission made up
another 45 pages, bringing the total for the two companies to
1264 pages. In this study, it took one experienced full-time
researcher 26 working days to analyse 105 pages, an average of 4
pages per day. If only half the 1521 pages submitted by four
TTCs required close analysis, this would take 190 days (eight and
a half months) to accomplish. Even a straightforward reading
with no attempt at analysis would clearly take a very long time.
Given that there were many other submissions from organisations
and individuals (2444 in total, excluding brief ‘campaign’
responses [54]), this raises questions over the capacity of public
bureaucracies to assimilate, synthesize, and consider the evidence
submitted.
Misleading Quoting of Evidence
This was a technique heavily used in the BAT and to a lesser
extent in the JTI submissions. It involved inaccurate reporting
of objectives, methods, findings, or conclusions of studies;
presenting a minor point as a main conclusion; and the
‘tweezers method’ of partially quoting the original source and
omitting qualifying information. The effect of all these
practices was to distort or even contradict the meanings in
the original source with the result that evidence supportive of
SP was transformed into evidence against SP. There were 28
instances of this technique in the 15 pages analysed in the BAT
submission and 13 instances in the 26 pages analysed in the
JTI submission. Eliciting examples of this technique was labour
and time intensive as it involved detailed examination of
original sources. This technique relied for its effectiveness on
the reluctance and/or inability of third parties (bureaucrats,
interest groups, academic researchers) to devote time to such
scrutiny.
A frequently employed method of inaccurate reporting was
conflating absence of evidence with evidence of absence, i.e.,
arguing that no connection was found between smoking and
packaging when the studies concerned had not explored this
relationship. For example, in reporting results of a survey
examining reasons for quitting [55], BAT claimed that ‘none of
the main reasons stated involved packaging’ [32]. But examina-
tion of the survey reveals that packaging was not a response
option, so it could not be selected as a reason. There were eight
other instances of this technique in the BAT and JTI
submissions.
BAT argued that, far from increasing the salience of health
warnings, SP ‘may actually reduce smokers’ attention to warnings’,
citing as evidence a study in the Moodie review [56] that
compared participants’ eye movements when viewing branded
and plain packs.
‘The researchers concluded that daily smokers exhibited
more eye movements towards health warnings when the
pack was branded than when it was plain…’ [32].
This was not the conclusion of the study by Munafo and
colleagues [56]. The study concluded that SP had no effect on daily
smokers whose attention to warnings remained the same (and did
not decrease as suggested by BAT), while it appeared to increase
attention to health warnings among non-smokers and light, non-
established smokers.
BAT also claimed that the DH had previously concluded that
there was not enough evidence to support SP:
‘When the Department of Health examined Plain Packaging
… in 2008 it concluded that: ‘‘the research evidence into this
[plain packaging] initiative is speculative, relying on asking
people what they might do in a certain situation’’’ [32,
emphasis added].
This statement was not, however, a conclusion; the DH document
listed five ‘positive effects’ and seven ‘potential disadvantages’ of
SP, and the extract BAT quoted was one of the disadvantages
[57].
One of JTI’s criticisms of the Moodie review was that it had
‘inappropriately’ included studies ‘which exist only in abstract
form’, something that would limit thorough critical assessment
[33]. Three studies (out of 37) were cited as examples. Yet, despite
the methodological challenges, it is considered good practice to
include grey literature in systematic reviews in order to reduce
publication bias [58,59,60]. Furthermore, the review’s bibliogra-
phy shows that for one [61], the authors had access to an
associated PhD thesis and for another [62], to a draft/unpublished
manuscript; it was not clear whether a full version was available in
the third case [63].
JTI also claimed that the review’s authors had ignored
reports by two JTI experts, Devinney and Keegan, despite the
citation of one by Devinney [39] in the review’s protocol [64],
resulting in the Moodie review being ‘at best flawed, and at
worst, skewed’ [33]. Intriguingly, JTI acknowledged (in the
same paragraph) that the reports could not have been included
in the systematic review as they were secondary reviews and
the systematic review only included primary studies. Further-
more, the Devinney report was cited in the Moodie review’s
protocol as an example of a review that ‘failed to adopt a
systematic approach’, confirming the need for a systematic
review [64], which JTI failed to mention when making its
claim of exclusion.
While not exactly inaccurate reporting, the ‘tweezers method’
misrepresented original studies through selectivity. According to
JTI, the Moodie review concluded that studies had failed to show
that SP would have a positive impact on smoking behaviours:
‘… [the review] finds that the ‘‘overall pattern of findings is
mixed’’’ [33].
However, this sentence in the review continues: ‘…. mixed, but
tends to be supportive of plain packaging being perceived to have
a likely deterrent effect on smoking’ [30]. This part of the sentence
was omitted from the JTI quotation.
BAT claimed that a US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
document confirmed that graphic warnings (which the Moodie
review found would become more salient and effective on
standardised packs) did not impact on smoking cessation:
‘… the US FDA Regulatory Impact Assessment estimated
that the impact of the graphic warnings on reducing
Tobacco Company Use and Misuse of Evidence in Policy
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smoking rates was ‘‘in general not statistically distinguishable
from zero’’’ [33].
The FDA document in question relates to the introduction of
graphic warnings in the US from September 2012 as a result of ‘…
substantial evidence indicating that larger … warnings including a
graphic component … would offer significant health benefits over
the existing warnings’ [65]. The extract BAT quoted was from a
technical appendix (p. 230 of the 231-page document) that
explains the statistical uncertainty around the estimates. The full
quotation is:
‘Although both of the estimation methods… lead to the
conclusion that graphic warning labels will reduce smoking
rates, FDA has had access to very small data sets, so our
effectiveness estimates are in general not statistically
distinguishable from zero; we therefore cannot reject, in a
statistical sense, the possibility that the rule will not change
the U.S. smoking rate. Therefore, the appropriate lower
bound on benefits is zero’ (p. 230) [65].
The BAT submission quoted part of a report by the US Surgeon
General [66] as corroboration of the company’s argument that
‘packaging is not a relevant factor in driving [smoking]’ and that
the ‘real’ drivers were parental and peer influences, risk
preferences, socioeconomic factors, access, and price [32]. These
factors are indeed highlighted in the Surgeon General’s report [66]
in Chapter 4, which covers ‘social, environmental, cognitive and
genetic influences’ on smoking among youth and young adults.
However, Chapter 5 of the report examines ‘the tobacco industry’s
influences on the use of tobacco among youth’ and concludes that
there is ‘sufficient evidence’ of a causal relationship between
‘advertising and promotion’ and ‘initiation and progression’ of
tobacco use (p. 10) and that there is ‘suggestive’ but not ‘sufficient’
evidence that tobacco companies have changed packaging and
design in ways that have increased the products’ ‘appeal to
adolescents and young adults’ (p. 10). Chapter 5, in other words,
suggests that packaging is a relevant factor in driving smoking, but
this chapter is not mentioned by BAT.
Mimicked Scientific Critique
This strategy, central to the JTI submission but also used by
BAT, involved the detailed inspection, mainly by commissioned
experts, of individual published SP studies and the Moodie review
for methodological rigour and value, resulting in the rejection of
the entire body of evidence for SP as flawed. This strategy worked
at a deeper level because its discovery required broad epistemo-
logical understandings of science; specialised expertise in a large
number of disciplines, research traditions, and methodologies;
and skills in interpretive analysis, unlikely to be common among
civil servants. Of the 37 studies in the Moodie review, 23 were
subjected to parallel review across five JTI expert reports
[36,37,38,39,40] (although, for two of these, unpublished versions
were critiqued in industry reports). All 23 reported findings
supportive of SP and all 23 were found to be ‘methodologically
flawed and unreliable’; by contrast, in the Moodie review, 21
were rated as ‘medium’ and two as ‘high’ quality [30]. The
industry experts found the Moodie review itself to be similarly
flawed and unreliable. In reaching this conclusion, the experts
appeared to use scientific methods of critique but close
examination of the critiques showed that these were embedded
in an essentially unscientific paradigm. They superficially
resembled scientific peer review in that they declared the
approach and evaluative criteria used in reviewing, identified
methodologically problematic aspects of the studies (relating to
design, data collection, and analysis) and explained how these
might be overcome, and assessed the overall ‘reliability’ of the
studies and whether their conclusions were justified by the
reported findings. In doing so, the reviews used scientific
terminology, even what might be called jargon. However, we
identify and describe four features that marked these industry
reviews as inauthentic and rendered them a ‘mimicked’ version of
scientific critique: seeking methodological perfection; insisting on
methodological uniformity; lack of rigour; and adopting the
litigation model (Table 2).
Table 2. TTC practices for misusing scientific evidence, identified through analysis of TTC submission documents.
Type of Industry Practice Techniques
Misleading quoting of evidence Misquoting N Inaccurately reporting objectives, methods, findings, or conclusions of
studies
Selective quoting N The ‘tweezers’ method: Reporting extracts out of context in a misleading
way by partially quoting and/or omitting qualifying information
Misinterpretation N Presenting a minor point as a main conclusion
N Presenting absence of evidence as evidence of absence
Mimicked scientific critique Seeking methodological perfection N Insistence on observation of actual behaviour
N Exaggerating impact of limitations
N Ignoring research governance
Insisting on methodological uniformity N Privileging marketing research
N Rejecting qualitative methodology
Adopting the litigation model N Privileging experts
N Piece-by-piece review
Lack of rigour N Incorrect reading/interpreting of studies
N Double standards
N Lack of clarity
Evidential landscaping Promoting alternative evidence N Citing behavioural studies of individuals to oppose a population-scale
intervention
Excluding relevant evidence N Omitting internal industry research on the role of packaging in marketing
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001629.t002
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Seeking methodological perfection. As SP is not widely
implemented, observational evidence of its effects on smoking is
not available. Research has therefore focused on three psycho-
social mechanisms through which SP is likely to reduce smoking
rates: reducing the appeal of packs and products; increasing
the salience and effectiveness of warnings; and reducing
misperceptions of product strength and harm [30]. This
approach—obtaining the best available evidence within contextual
limitations—is a key feature of scientific research [67,68] but was
vigorously rejected by the industry and its experts. BAT argued
that mechanisms could only be considered once there was evidence
of an actual impact on smoking behaviours, failing to acknowledge
that the reverse was just as legitimate a scientific objective. JTI
similarly rejected the legitimacy and value of mechanisms
research.
Absence of ‘real world evidence’ [34], ‘actual behavioural
outcomes’ [40], and correspondence between experimental results
and ‘actual consumer behaviour’ [39] were repeated criticisms in
industry experts’ critiques of the SP literature. Studies were
dismissed because they did not examine actual cigarette purchas-
ing and smoking decisions or because experimental tasks did not
replicate the real world. For example, experiments conducted in
an environment where not all packages were plain could not be
used to predict purchasing behaviours under a SP regime when all
packaging would be plain [34,38,40]. Clearly, experiments are, by
their nature, artificial and are often conducted because examining
real-life behaviours and events is not feasible.
Because observational evidence cannot be obtained without the
introduction of SP (as JTI acknowledged in its submission) [33],
JTI, BAT, and industry experts effectively locked themselves into a
nihilistic position that could potentially prevent the introduction of
SP indefinitely: SP could not be introduced without evidence that
it changed actual smoking behaviours; this evidence could not be
obtained without the introduction of SP; and since SP could not be
introduced without this evidence, SP could never be introduced.
This premise was also future-proofed against emerging evidence
from the Australian experience with SP:
‘… even if [SP legislation in Australia] survives legal
challenges … differences between markets may confound
comparisons or the transposition of effects’ [33].
It was suggested that the ‘ideal’ SP study, in line with ‘proper
research design’, would be a randomised controlled trial that
randomised different cities over a ‘long time period’ to having/not
having SP [34]. This is clearly an unfeasible proposition not least
because population mobility would mean that both groups have
access to branded and standardised packages, rendering the results
meaningless.
Perfectionism was also evident in the industry’s representation
of research limitations: the presence of limitations (regardless of
nature, severity, and the extent to which they impact on the
validity of findings) indicated wholesale failure of a study. All
studies, including the best designed and conducted, are subject to
some limitations, but one industry expert claimed that it was
possible to design and conduct research with no limitations. While
acknowledging that ‘no study was perfect’, he declared that ‘a well
designed and executed study can avoid and/or correct for such
limitations’ [38]. Having built this argument, the industry experts
single-mindedly focused on identifying every conceivable limita-
tion of the studies they reviewed (using narrowly defined criteria as
explained in the following section, Insisting on methodological
uniformity), while remaining silent on their strengths (Tables 3 and
4). Consequently, not one of the studies reviewed was found to
provide ‘reliable’ evidence that SP would be effective [40], despite
the vast majority having been published in peer-reviewed journals.
Even one study that most closely fitted the experts’ model of
research and met virtually all their criteria, that by Thrasher and
colleagues [49], was dismissed as ‘unreliable’ (Table 4).
This view of limitations appeared to be operative in the
industry’s critique of the Moodie review, along with an apparent
failure to understand the logic of synthesis:
‘Adding together multiple flawed studies does not make
reliable an unreliable study … students who fail one exam
do not have their position improved if they fail multiple
exams’ [33].
‘Consistent results from studies that uniformly have the same
methodological problems provide zero confidence in any
conclusion except, perhaps, that the research designs were
flawed in consistent ways’ [34].
In evidence synthesis, limitations of included studies are dealt
with in two ways: studies judged to be below a quality threshold
due to severe limitations are excluded; and the limitations of the
included studies are taken into account through weighting and
interpretation of results [58].
Perfectionism also led to suggestions that would breach
research governance requirements. Devinney’s insistence on
studying actual purchasing outcomes or incentive-compatible
measures [40], for example, would likely necessitate the exposure
of young non-smokers (given that this is the target group of
interest in standardised packaging) to attractive cigarette packs, a
study design unlikely to receive ethical approval given what is
already known on the impact of tobacco marketing (e.g., see
Table 3). Keegan [38] and Devinney [40] argue that participants
should not be informed of the purpose and sponsor of the
research because this information would bias their responses.
Failure to provide this information would breach ethics require-
ments in both social and health research, where researchers are
obliged to inform potential participants of the purpose, methods,
uses, and funding of the research [69,70].
Demanding the perfect study design regardless of real-life and
methodological constraints is clearly an unscientific position, at
least outside the laboratory, but this was the premise of much
industry critique of published SP studies, with the result that the
reviewed evidence base for SP was discounted.
Insisting on methodological uniformity. The industry
critiques of SP studies and the Moodie review were all framed by
the discipline of market research and associated methodological
conventions. The experts’ disciplinary backgrounds included law,
marketing, psychology, management, economics, and statistics;
none declared expertise in tobacco control or public health. Keegan
and Devinney reported using a set of assessment criteria for ‘good
research’, citing mainly market research or public opinion research
organisations as sources. Discrete choice experiments were desig-
nated as the best model for experiments involving purchasing
decisions [40].These narrow standards were then used to system-
atically dismiss any study that did not fit the market research model,
failing to recognise that other study types were valid and that many
of the research objectives of the studies undertaken could not have
been met via such a research model (Table 3).
Furthermore, the quantitative paradigm was accepted as the
only scientifically acceptable one and qualitative methodology was
dismissed, based on quantitative criteria, as useless.
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‘… eight of the studies [in the Moodie review] were little
more than small sample focus groups and two other studies
were interview based; yet these were considered to be
equally valid to other studies in the discussion’ [33].
‘Most of the normal checks that one attributes to good
research practice … are violated [in focus groups]. One
cannot control for truthfulness or incentive compatibility nor
can the focus group questioning be subject to statistical
analysis …’ [40].
In social science research, focus groups are not conducted to
obtain statistical or generalisable findings but to elicit attitudes,
beliefs, and experiences in a relatively naturalistic, informal
manner [71]; their rigour is assessed using method-specific
concepts and criteria. Qualitative studies, including focus groups,
are increasingly recognised (e.g., by the UK’s Cochrane Collab-
oration) as integral components in good quality evidence syntheses
[72].
The Moodie review was dismissed as ‘the considered opinion of
the author undertaking the review’ and ‘a focus group of
researchers giving their opinion’ [33] because it used (qualitative)
narrative synthesis rather than (quantitative) meta-analysis due to
heterogeneity of the studies. Although challenging, narrative
synthesis is an established method with authoritative guidelines
available for its conduct [58]. The industry’s criticism also appears
to confuse a systematic review that uses narrative synthesis (e.g., the
Moodie review) with a narrative, non-systematic, review [34].
The industry experts’ methodological approach to reviewing the
SP evidence base represents a fundamental failure to understand
the requirement for methodological pluralism. A key indicator of
quality in all research is the fit between the research question and
the method(s) because no one paradigm or method can answer all
types of research questions.
Lack of rigour. A central tenet of scientific review is
diligence, and reviewers take great care to acquire a full and
accurate understanding of the original sources they are reviewing;
they use a disciplined and methodical approach, applying
evaluative criteria consistently across studies to prevent biased
judgment. In reviewing the two SP papers by Hammond et al [48]
and Thrasher et al [49], JTI expert Devinney [40] appeared to
disregard study objectives, experimental processes, analytic
strategies, and steps taken by the original authors to minimise
the impact of limitations on findings (Tables 3 and 4). In the main
TTC submissions, as well as expert reviews, evaluative criteria
were used inconsistently, leading in some instances to the use of
double standards. For example, despite the industry’s criticisms of
self-reported beliefs, attitudes, experiences, and intentions in SP
research, other studies that used these methods were promoted as
good evidence because the results favoured the industry’s case
[32]. The TTCs criticised SP studies for jumping from data on
particular populations to universal ‘speculations’ but this was
exactly what the BAT submission did in arguing that SP might
generate a ‘forbidden fruit’ effect and increase youth uptake of
smoking [32]. This argument was based on a single study [73], the
authors of which warned that its findings were ‘difficult to
generalise and extrapolate’. The phenomenon of pack ‘appeal’,
one mechanism linked to smoking uptake and therefore studied by
public health researchers, was condemned as an ‘amorphous and
vague concept … lacking in any evidential foundation … and
arbitrary’ and could not justify the introduction of SP, JTI argued
[33]. But JTI expert Devinney used the term liberally without
objecting to it in his report [40] and Keegan referred to it in
describing attitudinal research, for example to determine the
appeal of detergent packaging [38].
One industry criticism of the Moodie review was that it was
‘inherently biased and self-interested’ [33] because its authors were
‘proponents and advocates of plain packaging’ [32] who worked
together and ‘recycled’ information and methodologies [32]. This
argument indicates a misunderstanding of scientific work.
Evidence synthesis requires the collaboration of scientists/
academics with a range of relevant expertise [58] working in the
same or related fields and whose work is subject to peer-review.
Furthermore, this criticism disregards the fact that the industry
experts produced mainly single-author reports at the behest of the
tobacco companies (although some declared independence) that
were not peer-reviewed.
Adopting the litigation model. The industry reviews
appeared to be embedded within a litigation—not scientific—
model. Some industry experts referred to parts of their reports that
would normally be labelled ‘appendix’ or ‘chapter’ as ‘exhibits’,
and their critiques resembled courtroom testimonies aimed at
demolishing the adversary’s case. In the main TTC submissions,
the experts were posited as sources of higher scientific authority,
representing ‘the best contemporary scientific thinking’ [33] and
were cited extensively. Demonstrating credibility was an important
part of this project, with author CVs in the expert reports ranging
between 10 and 20 pages and in one instance taking up 61 pages of
a 98-page report [41]. Privileging the individual expert is a legal
phenomenon and the legitimacy ascribed to individual experts’
testimonies in the courts is fundamentally different from collec-
tively established and consensus-based scientific legitimacy devel-
oped within specialised ‘communities of practice’ [74]. The
tobacco company commissioned experts, working outside the
peer-review system, dismissed the (peer-reviewed) evidence base
for SP as flawed and unusable. In doing so, it was clear that they
were attempting to establish an alternative system of scientific
legitimacy.
Another manifestation of the litigation model was the experts’
piece-by-piece approach to reviewing. Individual studies were
examined in depth to determine whether any—on its own—
constituted a warrant for SP and, following systematic decon-
struction, none was found to be good enough to justify SP.
‘In summary … it is my expert opinion that none of the
Studies provide [sic] reliable evidence that plain packaging
would be effective in achieving the public policy goals of
changing actual smoking behaviour …’ [40].
In court, each piece of evidence (i.e., each study and the Moodie
review) is treated as a separate piece of evidence and each needs to
be undermined and discredited in turn until no evidence remains
that could damage one’s client’s case. By contrast, in scientific
work, it is essential that the extant research is synthesised and
greater confidence in the findings established through the
cumulative ‘weight of the evidence’ [75].
To sum up, the two TTC submissions (by BAT and JTI) and the
associated expert reports used different combinations of the
techniques of mimicked critique we have documented here to
dismiss the entire literature supportive of SP.
Evidential Landscaping
As well as dismissing research that supported SP, another, more
expansive, strategy in the submissions was to change the evidential
landscape within which the policy debate was conducted by
introducing and promoting research that examined non-packaging
Tobacco Company Use and Misuse of Evidence in Policy
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Table 3. Industry critique of Hammond et al, 2011.
Hammond et al, 2011 [48]: On-line survey of 18- to19-year-old females (smokers and non-smokers) in the US; randomised exposure to different
pack designs; rating for appeal and health risk+behavioural pack selection task. Finding: female branded packs associated with glamour, slimness,
attractiveness, and less harm compared to plain packs.
Devinney (2012) critique [40] Review of Devinney critique Practices of mimicked scientific critique
‘the lack of actual behavioural outcomes
or incentive compatible measures that
represent how individuals would make
choices in the broader context of purchasing
are quite serious.’ (p. 31)
The complexity of smoking uptake decisions
and the fact that, for young people, cigarette
packs may be proffered by friends rather than
purchased appears not to be recognised. Nor
does the fact that the outcomes were based
on previous research (including tobacco industry
market research) and specifically explore the
mechanisms through which packaging (and SP) is
likely to impact on smoking behaviour.
Insisting on methodological uniformity
Behavioural task was used: respondents were asked
which, if any, packs they would like to be sent upon
conclusion of the study.
Lack of rigour
Studying actual cigarette pack purchasing
behaviour or any close incentive compatible
proxy among young non-smokers (as included in the
Hammond study) is likely to be deemed unethical.
Seeking methodological perfection
‘The ‘‘Male brands’’ that are meant as
controls have completely different brand
names, pack dimensions and colours.’ (p. 34)
In line with evidence cited by Devinnney that
intentions most closely relate to actual purchasing
when they are for existing products (p. 12), brands
used are real brands. The reality is that male brands
are different from female brands and thus the two
cannot be both real and identical.
Lack of rigour
The above is acknowledged in the paper and
for this reason the male brands are excluded
from some analyses.
Lack of rigour
‘The research uses 5-point scales …
these 5-point scales are then arbitrarily
aggregated so that they are dichotomous
(i.e., ‘‘1’’ and ‘‘0’’). Such arbitrary aggregation
is completely unacceptable based on the norms
and standards of market research.’ (p. 32)
This was not a market research study. Insisting on methodological uniformity
Dichotomous scales were not arbitrarily
selected but used to provide a more intuitive
metric. Furthermore, all analyses were repeated
using both the five-point and the dichotomous
outcome variable with the same pattern of results.
Lack of rigour
‘Questions relating to ‘‘tar delivery’’ …
and ‘‘health risks’’ are: (a) assuming
that the individual is competent to
understand the meaning of ‘‘tar delivery’’;
and (b) define ‘‘health risks’’ in a manner
that is comparable between individuals…’
(p. 32). And later: ‘(a) it must be clear what
is being rated – the ‘‘object’’ must be clear
to those being asked to do the rating, (b)
what makes up the construct is well
articulated – that the ‘‘attributes’’ of the object
are understood and valid, and (c) all of the
raters are comparable – in other words, the raters
are knowledgeable and relevant.’ (p. 33)
Research shows most smokers and non-smokers
have knowledge about the health risks of smoking
and understand that tar is a toxin in cigarette
smoke [92], [93].
Decisions on tar delivery/health risks are made
routinely when purchasing cigarettes without
additional information being available to the purchaser.
Provision of additional information in the study would
introduce an artificiality that Devinney would seek to avoid.
Lack of rigour
Tobacco companies have used similar
measures in their own research.
Lack of rigour
While it is possible that respondents had
different conceptualisations of tar and health
risk, etc., the differences will be balanced across
experimental conditions given participant random
allocation.
Lack of rigour
‘The vast majority of the analyses are
based upon pair-wise comparisons…
where the scores are completely
dependent upon the alternative against
which they are being compared.’ (p. 35)
Packages were rated individually, one at a time,
and so the scores were not dependant on the
comparator as suggested.
Lack of rigour
Tobacco Company Use and Misuse of Evidence in Policy
PLOS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 8 March 2014 | Volume 11 | Issue 3 | e1001629
issues and, at the same time, excluding relevant industry research
on packaging.
Promoting alternative evidence. The industry pointed to
the literature on psychological and social explanations of smoking
behaviours and individual decision-making to argue that packag-
ing was irrelevant to smoking behaviours and decisions. The DH
and the Moodie review were said to ‘ignore’ this parallel evidence
base.
‘… the real drivers of smoking initiation include factors such
as parental influences, risk preferences, peer influences,
socioeconomic factors, access and price’ [32].
‘Numerous government funded and independent studies
also show that factors other than packaging are the real
drivers of decisions relating to quitting and relapse’
[33].
Table 3. Cont.
Hammond et al, 2011 [48]: On-line survey of 18- to19-year-old females (smokers and non-smokers) in the US; randomised exposure to different
pack designs; rating for appeal and health risk+behavioural pack selection task. Finding: female branded packs associated with glamour, slimness,
attractiveness, and less harm compared to plain packs.
Devinney (2012) critique [40] Review of Devinney critique Practices of mimicked scientific critique
‘The experimental conditions… do not
allow for effective and efficient
comparison of the package attributes,
as the design is not efficient, orthogonal
or balanced. For example, the brands
appear different numbers of times …
A properly designed study would control
for brand effects, dimension effects, colour
effects, price and other package and product
attributes.’ (pp. 34–35)
This fails to acknowledge the purpose of the study:
to test the effect, on young women, of pack design
(descriptors, colour and imagery) and of removing these
elements (as would occur with SP). Had the intention
been to study pack size, price, brand family, etc., and to
determine which particular combination was more
appealing (as might occur in a market research study),
then these should have been balanced as suggested,
but it was not.
Insisting on methodological uniformity
Instead, and consistent with the study’s objectives,
the only differences between conditions were the elements
being examined (pack design), while other elements
(pack size and shape, brand family) were constant and
the brands appeared an equal number of
times across the three female experimental
conditions.
Lack of rigour
Various other complaints about the statistical
analysis.
e.g.: ‘Econometrically, the study has a
number of flaws. Statistical efficiency
would require that analysis of the
preferences for specific brands be
estimated using a pooled regression
where the independent variables are
conditional on the alternatives examined.
In other words, because each participant
will see a different mixture of eight packages
we would want to know if the comparison set
influences the choice. It is good practice to
control for the choice set in which the
evaluations are being made. Some bias
might be mitigated by the ‘one at a time’
approach… but it is also likely that the
mixture of items seen in the set of eight
will have an influence. Normally good research
practice is to control for items appearing in the
evaluative set as a means of seeing whether any
undue bias occurs.’ (p. 35)
Incorrect interpretation of the study design and
objectives as outlined above; all participants in each
condition saw the same set of eight packages.
Lack of rigour
While market research may have taken a different
analytical approach, the critique fails to acknowledge
that the between-group analysis in which participants
are randomly allocated to groups is designed to reduce
bias and that confounding was controlled for in the
analysis.
Insisting on methodological uniformity
Silent on study strengths Study strengths, including those consistent with the
evaluative criteria set (Devinney p. 13–17) were:
recent study; question design based on existing
research; good sample size; subjects of relevant
age (18–19 years); randomisation producing
similar groups thus minimising bias; potential
confounders controlled for; results statistically
significant and consistent; included a behavioural task.
Seeking methodological perfection
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001629.t003
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JTI submitted two expert reports to support this argument. One
was prepared by two marketing professors who drew on the
literatures on ‘consumer, cognitive and social psychology, behav-
ioural economics and marketing research’ and concluded that SP
would be ineffective because smoking decisions and behaviours
were made on the basis of habit, goals and motives, peer
influences, the consumer mindset, and self-control [42]. The
other, by a psychology professor, argued changes in packaging
did not affect ‘adolescents’ experimentation with or use of
cigarettes’, which were based instead on sensation-seeking,
peer and family influences, a focus on rewards rather than
risks, and availability [41]. While this body of research clearly
makes an important contribution to knowledge on smoking
behaviours, it overlooks the overwhelming evidence that
Table 4. Industry critique of Thrasher et al, 2011.
Thrasher et al, 2011 [49]: Experimental auctions with adult smokers (US) bidding for different pack designs. Finding: lowest bid associated with
plain pack with prominent pictorial health warning.
Devinney (2012) critique [40] Review of Devinney critique
Practices of
mimicked scientific
critique
‘‘Incompleteness in balance of design’’ & issues of bias:
‘‘as one moves from experimental condition 1 to 2 to 3
to 4 the severity of the warning gets higher…and this is
obvious to all participants … individuals bidding on
what is clearly a ‘‘superior ‘‘and ‘‘inferior’’ product …
the study’s intent was clear [to participants]’’ (p. 43)
Each participant bid on two packs only, the second revealed only
after bidding on the first. The order was randomised & shown to
have no effect on bids, suggesting
intent was not obvious.
Lack of rigour
The study was not completely balanced in that sample
sizes for the different attribute levels varied. This will have
introduced some statistical inefficiency leading to less power
to detect a significant result. This was not mentioned.
Lack of rigour
‘The design lacks orthogonality. What would have been
more appropriate would be to vary conditions
orthogonally… What would then be discernible would
be the true effects of each component independent of
the others.’ (p. 43)
Orthogonality is relevant where aim is to assess interactive
effects of several components. Study aim was to assess impact
of pictorial warnings & added impact of plain packaging, which
was achieved.
Lack of rigour
‘… the bidding task is … unrealistic to evaluate the
importance of plain packaging. If plain packaging
becomes the norm, the most appropriate case would
be what happens when ALL brands are in plain
packaging. Again, this could be incorporated into an
experimental task by adding additional products into
the bidding mixture. This solves two problems in the
study. There is the fact that the study is clearly about
cigarettes and health warnings on pack (as people see
their preferred brand and two different packs). However,
this can be hidden by having a basket of items on which
they bid and the experimental design is the mixture of
the types of products in the basket. One can then
estimate the hedonic price of the various packs. In
specific situations, as laid out in the experimental
design, there will be plain pack versus plain pack
alternatives, allowing the researcher to examine the
price elasticity in very different market conditions.’
(pp. 43–44)
Advantages/disadvantages of multiple experimental designs are
subject to debate.
Insisting on
methodological
uniformity
This argument is unclear, e.g.: is Devinney referring just to having
cigarettes or also different products in plain packs in his
intended design? If all brands are in plain packs, how will plain and
‘plain pack alternatives’ be compared?
Lack of rigour
‘The bidding task is… unrealistic to evaluate the
importance of plain packaging. If plain packaging
becomes the norm, the most appropriate case would
be what happens when ALL brands are in plain
packaging.’ (p. 43)
Impossible to replicate the real world Seeking
methodological
perfection
Study limitations acknowledged Lack of rigour
Fails to acknowledge that the experiment was close to real world
(e.g., in grocery stores, real money used, smokers kept the packs),
it is still useful in revealing the most likely demand estimate, and
that limitations of the experiment were acknowledged.
Seeking
methodological
perfection
Silent on study strengths Study strengths included: behavioural outcome; good sample size;
randomisation; similar groups; statistically significant and consistent
results. The study met many of the criteria set by Devinney, but this
was overlooked.
Seeking
methodological
perfection
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001629.t004
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tobacco marketing also plays a key role in shaping smoking
behaviour [76] and cannot be legitimately used to argue that
SP will prove to be an ineffective tobacco control measure.
Smoking uptake is a complex phenomenon with multiple
explanatory factors acting at both individual and population
levels—only some of which are amenable to intervention. It is
also a basic tenet of public health that population-level
interventions, such as SP, by virtue of reaching the whole
population, have a greater impact than individual-level
interventions [77], yet, the majority of interventions promoted
by the experts as more effective alternatives to SP were
targeted at individuals.
Excluding relevant internal tobacco industry
research. The DH consultation brief included a request for
respondents to provide ‘any further evidence about tobacco
packaging that you believe to be helpful’ [78]. Industry
documents previously made public as a result of litigation
and other more recent documentation [79] show that
packaging is central to current marketing efforts and that the
industry funds ‘systematic and extensive’ internal research on
packaging [80]. This research covers RJ Reynolds (the
international division of which was later taken over by JTI),
Philip Morris, Brown & Williamson, American Tobacco
Company, Lorillard Tobacco Company [80,81,82], and
British American Tobacco Company [80,82]. It shows that
pack style can impact on smokers’ perception of cigarette taste
[80]; can (misleadingly) suggest that the contents carry lower
health risks because they are portrayed as ‘milder’ or ‘lighter’
than other brands [82]; and is used by companies to increase
product appeal to targeted groups, including young people
[81,82]. This body of evidence is therefore at least as—if not
more—relevant to standardised packaging as the psycho-social
body of evidence on smoking decision-making promoted by the
TTCs in their submissions. It is clear both from this study and
our earlier work [31] that none of the four TTCs referred to
internal tobacco industry research on packaging in their
submissions, despite citing a very large volume of other
evidence to support their arguments. We do not know whether
internal packaging research was shared with the DH on a
confidential basis. However, the industry’s public argument
that packaging does not impact on smoking behaviours clearly
lacks the benefit of the industry’s own research on packaging.
Discussion
We have reported the methods BAT and JTI used in their
written submissions to undermine the evidence base for SP. The
companies submitted a very large volume of evidence, reported
studies in an inaccurate and misleading fashion, and sought to
diminish the value and exaggerate the shortcomings of studies by
using mimicked scientific critique. This last technique involved
judging published studies against unrealistic and perfectionist
criteria, dismissing research traditions and methods outside a
narrowly defined paradigm (e.g., quantitative marketing research),
adopting a litigation style that contrasted with the scientific model,
and using non-rigorous review practices. In addition, they
disregarded the consistency in the evidence for SP and tried to
divert attention away from packaging to an alternative, less
relevant body of evidence, while excluding a highly relevant body
of industry research on packaging. These practices were conducted
under the rubric of scientific critique and gave a misleading
impression of scientific credibility. Our analysis suggests that they
amount instead to an attempt to create a parallel and competing
‘scientific’ discourse. In formulating their response to the
stakeholder consultation on SP, the tobacco companies reframed
prevailing scientific norms and practices as somehow substandard
and corrupt, seeking to impress on policy makers their own—
distorted—interpretation of science and the scientific method.
It is not possible to ascertain how successful the tobacco industry
was in influencing the UK government’s stance on SP. Neverthe-
less, the government’s announcement that it was postponing a
decision due to concerns about the evidence base, combined with
our findings and the industry’s record in manipulating evidence to
create policy inertia [83], suggest that industry plans to contest the
evidence base [84,85] met with some success, at least initially. The
fact that this occurred despite the favourable conclusions of the
Moodie review and strong evidence of the role of packaging in
marketing [80,81,82] is notable.
This study had a number of limitations. Our analysis covered
just two of the four tobacco company submissions. However,
content analysis of how evidence was cited in all four submissions
[31] suggests that our findings may be applicable to the other two
TTCs, while leaked documents [84,85] show Philip Morris
International (PMI) also intended to contest the evidence base
for SP. Additionally, we only focused on those sections dealing
with whether SP would achieve the intended public health
outcomes; we did not analyse sections on unintended consequenc-
es (economic, illicit trade, legal) that also cite and present different
types of evidence. More generally, our research represents only
one side of a dyadic phenomenon: the effectiveness of TTC
attempts at influencing public health policy depends on how
policymakers respond to such attempts. As intimated above, our
current research is unable to examine this issue in any detail.
Nevertheless, our work provides crucial insights into how TTCs
seek to discredit the evidence for a policy that runs counter to their
interests and how regulatory tools associated with the Better
Regulation agenda facilitate such efforts. In relation to the former,
our findings are consistent with a broad body of literature on
industry misuse of science and promotion of ‘sound science’. This
literature shows that industries attempt to prevent or delay
regulatory action aimed at limiting or removing harms associated
with their products by creating doubt about the validity of
scientific evidence that documents those harms. This extends from
the tobacco industry [9,10,11,13,86] to dioxin (a synthetic
carcinogen) [87], aspirin (in its association with Reye’s syndrome),
[12] and, more generally, to genetically modified corn (and its
potential to spread in the wild) [88], acid rain, and global warming
[8]. A recent study found that the alcohol industry adopted a
similar strategy to the TTCs’ in its submissions to the Scottish
government’s 2008 consultation on alcohol policies and minimum
pricing [5]. So extensive is the practice of creating doubt and
denying knowledge that Proctor has coined the term ‘agnotology’
(the cultural production of ignorance and its study) to describe,
inter alia, the tobacco industry’s manufacture of politically
motivated ignorance in its attempt to transform evidential
uncertainty into a paralysing search for certainty and subsequent
policy inaction [83].
It is important to understand that the socially constructed
nature of scientific work itself [50,89] makes its manipulation by
corporate interests possible. Science can be understood as a
negotiated order sustained by craft conventions that are formu-
lated, maintained, and altered over time within communities of
practice. Methodological choices and compromises need to be
made in response to contingencies; surrogate end points (e.g.,
mechanisms in SP research) are used when necessary; boundaries
of acceptable limitations are defined; and different epistemologies
(e.g., experimental, quantitative, and qualitative methods) are not
only tolerated but put to productive use singly and in combination.
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Scientific knowledge is ‘simply the best knowledge available to a
particular community working in a particular paradigm, with
particular assumptions, instruments, and techniques’ [90]. This
social nature of science constitutes a soft underbelly open to attack
by commercial interests—tobacco and other—in their efforts to
shape policy. A number of indicators have been suggested to help
distinguish genuine scientific critique from the mimicked version.
Two indicators suggested by de Camargo [91] are: ‘follow the
money’, i.e., industry funding of the critique; and the intended
audience, i.e., not scientific but public, legal, and regulatory
communities. We concur with both. Our earlier work highlighted
the significance of funding and independence [31]. For all the
resources deployed by tobacco companies to undermine the SP
evidence base, our analysis suggests that the industry’s decon-
struction was not particularly sophisticated from a scientific
perspective. This may be because it was not intended to be
persuasive to the scientific community, but was designed to speak
to politicians, bureaucrats, and ultimately, in the context of judicial
review, to judges. A third indicator, suggested by Jasanoff and
again confirmed by our data, is disciplinary affiliation and
perspective. Jasanoff points out that industry-commissioned
experts, who ‘sow reasonable doubt about the reliability of
particular scientific practices’, are often from different scientific
‘subcultures’ to those in which the original work was produced
[92]. They use ‘idealised norms’ of scientific practice, deploy an
‘inherently unforgiving’ perspective, and their objective is to
discredit by ‘exposing gaps and omissions’. Genuine scientific
critique, on the other hand, is typically conducted by those located
within the same scientific subculture (discipline/specialty) because
only they ‘may be truly in a position to evaluate each other’s
competence’ and is aimed at improving the work so that it can
contribute to ‘the larger enterprise of creating new knowledge’.
Jasanoff’s observation implies a fourth indicator—motivation. The
TTCs’ critiques were not intended, and did not originate, as
contributions to the stock of scientific knowledge on SP but were
produced in response to the public consultation on SP to support
the TTC argument that SP should not be introduced.
While the tobacco industry has a long history of challenging
scientific evidence in order to resist public health policies, the
Better Regulation agenda, with its emphasis on evidence and
requirement for stakeholder consultation, increases the utility
of this strategy. This is something the TTCs recognise.
Previous work shows that BAT predicted that the implemen-
tation of Better Regulation would enhance its ability to prevent
public health policies [2]. Recently leaked PMI documents
outlining the company’s plans to prevent the introduction of
SP in the UK suggest that PMI determined that ‘evidence
based policy’, an invitation to ‘wait and see what happens in
Australia’, and an emphasis on ‘Better Regulation’ should be
central to its campaign along with the argument that SP would
lead to increased illicit trade, adverse impacts on trade, and
legal issues [84]. PMI also identified ‘evidence based argu-
mentation’ as a strength of its corporate strategy in opposing
SP and the prospect of ‘government ignoring Better Regulation
principles’ as a threat to it [85]. The twin political impera-
tive—to base policies and regulation on scientific evidence
and, at the same time, to democratise science by inviting
review from stakeholders—provides significant opportunities
for tobacco and other corporate interests to challenge and
obstruct regulation by challenging and undermining the
evidence behind it. Questions therefore inevitably arise
concerning the scientific value and public interest implications
of subjecting evidence produced by non-commercially-affiliat-
ed academic researchers who have satisfied the increasingly
elaborate and rigorous demands of public funding agencies,
peer-review, and research governance systems to repeated
episodes of review by those with a vested interest. Placing a
formal obligation on civil servants to seek ‘stakeholders’ views
on … key assumptions and data’ [3] arguably amounts to a
vote of no or little confidence in the painstakingly constructed
and expensive edifice of public research.
A further problem presented is the question of how such reviews
are then handled by civil servants and politicians. Despite calls for
transparency [93], the use of evidence in policymaking remains a
black box. We do not know, for example, how closely the
evidential critiques submitted by BAT and JTI were read and
analysed and how much weight was placed on them. Without
spending considerable time (given the volume of the TTC
submissions) and without relevant scientific skills and knowledge,
civil servants would have little choice but to take the industry’s
scientific critiques at face value. Alternatively, considerable public
resources would need to be spent on analysis and verification by
external experts.
Conclusion
This study shows that the TTCs’ critique of the evidence in
favour of SP is highly misleading. Combined with our earlier work
highlighting the very low quality of the TTCs’ evidence against
SP, it suggests that the TTCs’ claim that SP will not lead to public
health benefits is largely without foundation. It also highlights that
the tools of Better Regulation, particularly stakeholder consulta-
tion, just as BAT predicted when pushing for their implementa-
tion, provide an opportunity for highly resourced corporations to
slow, weaken, or prevent public health policies.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Every year, about 6 million people die from
tobacco-related diseases and, if current trends continue,
annual tobacco-related deaths will increase to more than 8
million by 2030. To reduce this loss of life, national and
international bodies have drawn up various conventions and
directives designed to implement tobacco control measures
such as the adoption of taxation policies aimed at reducing
tobacco consumption and bans on tobacco advertising,
promotion, and sponsorship. One innovative but largely
unused tobacco control measure is standardised packaging
of tobacco products. Standardised packaging aims to
prevent the use of packaging as a marketing tool by
removing all brand imagery and text (other than name) and
by introducing packs of a standard shape and colour that
include prominent pictorial health warnings. Standardised
packaging was first suggested as a tobacco control measure
in 1986 but has been consistently opposed by the tobacco
industry.
Why Was This Study Done? The UK is currently
considering standardised packaging of tobacco products.
In the UK, Better Regulation guidance obliges officials to seek
the views of stakeholders, including corporations, on the
government’s cost and benefit estimates of regulatory
measures such as standardised packaging and on the
evidence underlying these estimates. In response to a public
consultation about standardised packaging in July 2013,
which considered submissions from several transnational
tobacco companies (TTCs), the UK government announced
that it would wait for the results of the standardised
packaging legislation that Australia adopted in December
2012 before making its final decision about this tobacco
control measure. Parliamentary debates and media state-
ments have suggested that doubt over the adequacy of the
evidence was the main reason for this ‘wait and see’ decision.
Notably, TTCs have a history of manufacturing uncertainty
about the scientific evidence related to the harms of
tobacco. Given the centrality of evidence to the debate
about standardised packaging, in this study, the researchers
analyse submissions made by two TTCs, British American
Tobacco (BAT) and Japan Tobacco International (JTI), to the
first UK consultation on standardised packaging (a second
review is currently underway and will report shortly) to
examine how TTCs used evidence to oppose standardised
packaging.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
analysed sub-sections of two of the four TTC submissions
(those submitted by BAT and JTI) made to the public
consultation using verification-oriented cross-documentary
analysis, which compared references made to published
sources with the original sources to ascertain how these
sources had been used, and interpretative analysis to
examine the conceptual significance of TTC critiques of the
evidence on standardised packaging. The researchers report
that the companies’ overall argument was that the evidence
base in support of standardised packaging was seriously
flawed and did not warrant the introduction of such
packaging. The researchers identified three ways in which
the TTC reports misrepresented the evidence base. First, the
TTCs misquoted published studies, thereby distorting the
main messages of these studies. For example, the TTCs
sometimes omitted important qualifying information when
quoting from published studies. Second, the TTCs under-
mined evidence by employing experts to review published
studies for methodological rigor and value in ways that did
not conform to normal scientific critique approaches
(‘mimicked scientific critique’). So, for example, the experts
considered each piece of evidence in isolation for its ability
to support standardised packaging rather than considering
the cumulative weight of the evidence. Finally, the TTCs
engaged in ‘evidential landscaping’. That is, they promoted
research that deflected attention from standardised packag-
ing (for example, research into social explanations of
smoking behaviour) and omitted internal industry research
on the role of packaging in marketing.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings suggest
that the TTC critique of the evidence in favour of
standardised packaging that was presented to the UK public
consultation on this tobacco control measure is highly
misleading. However, because the researchers’ analysis only
considered subsections of the submissions from two TTCs,
these findings may not be applicable to the other submis-
sions or to other TTCs. Moreover, their analysis only
considered the efforts made by TTCs to influence public
health policy and not the effectiveness of these efforts.
Nevertheless, these findings suggest that the claim of TTCs
that standardised packaging will not lead to public health
benefits is largely without foundation. More generally, these
findings highlight the possibility that the tools of Better
Regulation, particularly stakeholder consultation, provide an
opportunity for wealthy corporations to slow, weaken, or
prevent the implementation of public health policies.
Additional Information. Please access these websites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001629.
N The World Health Organization provides information about
the dangers of tobacco (in several languages) and an
article about first experiences with Australia’s tobacco
plain packaging law; for information about the tobacco
industry’s influence on policy, see the 2009 World Health
Organization report ‘Tobacco industry interference with
tobacco control’
N A UK parliamentary briefing on standardised packaging of
tobacco products, a press release about the consultation,
and a summary report of the consultation are available; the
ideas behind the UK’s Better Regulation guidance are
described in a leaflet produced by the Better Regulation
Task Force
N Cancer Research UK (CRUK) has a web page with
information on standardised packaging and includes
videos
N Wikipedia has a page on standardised packaging of
tobacco products (note: Wikipedia is a free online
encyclopaedia that anyone can edit; available in several
languages)
N The UK Centre for Tobacco Control Studies is a network of
UK universities that undertakes original research, policy
development, advocacy, and teaching and training in the
field of tobacco control
N TobaccoTactics.org, an online resource managed by the
University of Bath, provides up-to-date information on the
tobacco industry and the tactics it uses to influence
tobacco regulation
N SmokeFree, a website provided by the UK National Health
Service, offers advice on quitting smoking and includes
personal stories from people who have stopped smoking
N Smokefree.gov, from the US National Cancer Institute,
offers online tools and resources to help people quit
smoking
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